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Why didn’t you sell?: How Federal Courts are Unfairly Penalizing Defrauded Investors for 
Unrelated, Post-Corrective Disclosure Stock Gains 
 
By Samir Kurani 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Do you know what it feels like to be swindled?  George W. Bowen did.
1
  In January of 
1904, an agent of the Aetna Indemnity Company (“Aetna”) persuaded Mr. Bowen to purchase 
ten shares of Aetna stock for $125 per share by representing that each share had a par value of 
$100.
2
  The stock actually issued to Mr. Bowen, however, had a par value of only $50. Mr. 
Bowen consequently suffered a loss of $50 per share—the approximate equivalent of $1,258 per 
share today.
3
  In the melee of the unprecedented market growth preceding the Great Depression, 
many other investors were similarly defrauded.
4
   
In response, Congress passed the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange 
Act”).5   Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act made it unlawful to employ a manipulative or 
deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of securities in contravention of 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations.
6
  Pursuant to this statutory authority, 
the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5.
7
  Securities fraud regulations such as Rule 10b-5 are important 
because they protect investors and maintain public confidence in securities markets.
8
  
                                                 
1 Bowen v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 160 Iowa 548 (1913). 
2 Id. at 205.  
3 Id. at 206. 
4 See EDWARD T. MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT AND THE S.E.C. 14 (1948). 
5 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (West 2012); see James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under the 
Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 62, 64 (2004) (“When Congress passed enacted the securities acts, it was 
painfully aware of the Great Depression and believed that it was largely precipitated by abuses in the securities 
markets.”).   
6 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2012). 
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
8 See A.S. Goldman & Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Bureau of Sec., 163 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1999); MCCORMICK, 
supra note 4, at 11; Gordon, supra note 5, at 64. 
 2 
A hypothetical factual scenario that may give rise to a Rule 10b-5 claim appears as 
follows: 
Corporation X reports that it sells 100 widgets every month.  Corporation X's 
stock price is high.  Investors, encouraged by reported widget sales, buy millions 
of dollars worth of Corporation X stock.  It is then revealed that Corporation X 
misrepresented true widget sales, which had in actuality been only ten widgets per 
month.  Corporation X's stock price plummets and investors lose millions.  The 
investors now have a Rule 10b-5 claim against Corporation X for securities 
fraud.
9
 
 
In order to recover under Rule 10b-5, Corporation X shareholders would have to prove (1) a 
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter (i.e., a wrongful state of mind); (3) a 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss 
causation.
10
   
A rift has recently arisen regarding the economic loss and loss causation elements that 
threatens to undermine the purposes of Rule 10b-5.  Prior to 2005, there was a circuit split 
regarding the Rule 10b-5 loss causation standard.
11
  The majority view required a plaintiff to 
prove that disclosure of a company’s fraud caused the value of the plaintiff’s stock to decline.12  
The minority view held that a plaintiff must merely establish that the defendant’s fraud 
artificially inflated the plaintiff’s purchase price.13  The United States Supreme Court resolved 
the circuit split in its 2005 decision, Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo.
14
  The Court held that to 
survive a motion to dismiss, a 10b-5 plaintiff must allege that disclosure of the defendant’s fraud 
                                                 
9 See Evan Hill, The Rule 10b-5 Suit: Loss Causation Pleading Standards in Private Securities Fraud Claims After 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2661 (2010). 
10 Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
11 David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5 in Light of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1781 (2000).  
12 Id. at 1782. 
13 Id. 
14 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005). 
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caused the value of his stock to decline, as opposed to merely pleading that the fraud inflated the 
plaintiff’s purchase price.15      
Beginning with Malin v. XL Capital, United States district courts have interpreted Dura 
to require the dismissal of 10b-5 claims if, after disclosure of the defendant’s fraud, the 
plaintiff’s stock increased in value to above his average purchase price.16  The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York then applied the Malin rule in In re China 
North East Petroleum Holdings.
17
  The China North court held that the plaintiffs did not suffer 
an economic loss under Rule 10b-5 because their stock’s post-disclosure price appreciated to 
above their purchase price and, consequently, dismissed the complaint.
18
  Thereafter, in a case of 
first impression, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit bucked the trend and 
reversed the district court.
19
   The Second Circuit held that the Malin rule was inconsistent with 
both the out-of-pocket measure of damages applied in Rule 10b-5 cases and statutory authority 
that imposes a markedly different cap on a 10b-5 plaintiff’s damages.20   
                                                 
15 Id. at 344. 
16 In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:09-CV-2351-TWT, 2011 WL 2619092 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2011), reh’g 
denied, 2011 WL 3844221 (Aug. 29, 2011); In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 
351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Acticon, 692 F.3d 34; In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-
01695 (CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007), abrogated by Acticon, 692 F.3d 34; Ross v. 
Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2009); In re Estee Lauder Companies Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 2505 (LAK), 
2007 WL 1522620 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2007), abrogated by Acticon, 692 F.3d 34; Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No. 
3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005), abrogated by Acticon AG v. China N.E. 
Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012).    
17 China North, 819 F. Supp. 2d 351.    
18 Id. at 354. 
19 Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings, Ltd., 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012); Sarah R. Wolff and Jennifer L. 
Achilles, Second Circuit Holds that Stock Price Rebound After Disclosure of Fraud Does Not Negate Inference of 
Economic Loss at Pleading Stage of a Securities Fraud Suit, MONDAQ, 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/193770/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/Second+Circuit+Holds+that+Stock+Pr
ice+Rebound+after+Disclosure+of+Fraud+Does+Not+Negate+Inference+of+Economic+Loss+at+Pleading+Stage+
of+Securities+Fraud+Suit (last visited Aug. 28, 2012). 
20 Acticon, 692 F.3d 34. 41.  Under the out-of-pocket rule, the plaintiff’s damages are equal to the difference 
between what he paid for the securities and their actual value on the date of purchase—that is, the value of the 
securities absent the fraud.  See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1976); Janigan 
v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).  The pertinent statutory authority is 
a provision in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act which caps a 10b-5 plaintiff’s damages at the difference 
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This Comment argues that the Second Circuit’s approach is superior because the Malin 
rule unnecessarily increases transaction costs and is inconsistent with the reasoning put forth by 
the Dura Court.  This Comment further proposes that district courts hearing 10b-5 claims should 
strive to determine whether post-disclosure price rebounds are a market correction to an initial 
overreaction to disclosure of the fraud.  If they are, then offsetting the plaintiff’s damages is 
appropriate.  If the subsequent gain is, however, unrelated to the fraud, then offsetting is 
inappropriate.  Post-disclosure unrelated gain represents income that the plaintiff-shareholder is 
entitled to receive due to his investment.  Consequently, relabeling this post-disclosure, unrelated 
gain as compensation to the investor by barring his Rule 10b-5 claim is unjust and should not be 
permitted. 
Part II of this Comment trace the history and relevant components of the securities laws 
and the SEC Rule 10b-5 claim.  Part II then explains the elements of a 10b-5 claim and how 
Dura Pharmaceuticals affects the 10b-5 plaintiff’s consequent economic loss pleading 
requirements.  Part III describes how courts have applied the Dura standard to cases where there 
has been a post-corrective disclosure price recovery.  Part IV explains why post-disclosure price 
recovery should not preclude an inference of economic loss because such preclusion would 
unnecessarily increase transactions costs and is contrary to the reasoning set forth in Dura.  
II. THE SECURITIES LAWS, S.E.C. RULE 10b-5, AND THE 10b-5 CLAIM 
 
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
 
“Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it.”21 
 
 Courts ought not forget the circumstances that bring about congressional legislation, lest 
the evils it was designed to prevent be permitted to resurface.
22
  The Securities Act of 1933 (“the 
                                                                                                                                                             
between the plaintiff’s purchase price and the average trading price of that security during the 90-day period after 
the corrective disclosure.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78u–4(e)(1) (West 2012). 
21 GEORGE SANTAYANA, REASON IN COMMON SENSE: THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905).  
 5 
Securities Act”)23 and the Exchange Act,24 passed in the midst of the Great Depression, are no 
exception.  Thus, a brief description of the context in which Rule 10b-5 was promulgated will aid 
the subsequent discussion of the 10b-5 economic loss requirement.  
 The stock market crash of 1929 was one of the most devastating in the history of 
financial markets.
25
  During the preceding decade, American businesses prospered, and the value 
of securities
26
 experienced remarkable growth.
27
  Due to enormous profit potential and 
ineffective oversight,
28
 subterfuge became a well-practiced art by well-known and obscure firms 
alike.
29
  Fraudulent promoters and high-pressure salesman preyed on inexperienced investors and 
induced them to invest in extremely risky securities.
30
  A review of the practices of certain 
securities issuers during this period reveals an utter disregard for the well being of investors.
31
   
 During the 1920s, money flowed so freely that businesses could not resist the urge to 
issue securities beyond their current need for capital.
32
  Of the $50 billion worth of securities 
floated
33
 between the end of World War I and the early 1930s, about half turned out to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
22 See, cf., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 86 (2005) (noting that most judges begin the process of statutory 
interpretation by considering, inter alia, the statute’s history). 
23 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A § 77 (West 2012). 
24 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (West 2012). 
25 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929, at 111 (1955).  On October 24, 1929, the first day of 
panic, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) opened at 305.85.  Harold James, 1929: The New York Stock 
Market Crash, REPRESENTATIONS (Spring 2010) at 133.  By July 8, 1932, the DJIA had reached a low of 40.56, 
wiping out about $20 billion of wealth.  Id. at 135–36.   
26 “Securities,” in a legal sense, is a flexible principle that refers to financial assets sold “by those who seek the 
money of others on the promise of profits.”  Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967) (quoting S.E.C. v. C. 
M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)).  The Exchange Act provides an extensive categorical list of 
financial instruments that are securities including notes, stocks, futures, bonds, options, and “any instrument 
commonly known as a ‘security.’”  15 U.S.C.A. § 78(c) (West 2012).       
27 See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 18. 
28 See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 28–41 (1970). 
29 See id. at 29. 
30 See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 14, 19–20. 
31 See id. at 19. 
32 See id. at 18. 
33 “Floating” refers to a firm’s initial sale of securities to raise capital.  ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 57 (7th ed. 
2008).  
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worthless.
34
  The wild speculation led to inflated and unsupportable securities prices and 
culminated in the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression.
35
  In the 
wake of the crash, America’s faith in securities markets was crushed.36  Since the financial 
markets are an indispensable element of the American economy,
37
 Congress sought to revive 
public confidence in them by passing the securities acts.
38
 
 The Securities Act mandates disclosure of material information and seeks to prevent 
fraud in the primary market.
39
  In contrast, the Exchange Act addresses a wide range of issues 
regarding the secondary market,
40
 such as fraud, price manipulation, and insider trading.
41
  
Congress also used the Exchange Act to create the SEC and vest it with flexible enforcement and 
administrative powers over federal securities laws.
42
  
B. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5 
 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
43
 and SEC Rule 10b-5
44
 promulgated thereunder are 
the preeminent federal antifraud provisions governing the secondary market.
45
  Securities fraud 
                                                 
34 See H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, at 2 (1933).  
35 See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 19–20.  
36 See PARRISH, supra note 28, at 43.  
37 See Gordon, supra note 5, at 64. 
38 See id. (“When Congress enacted the securities acts, it was painfully aware of the Great Depression and believed 
that it was largely precipitated by abuses in the securities markets.”).   
39 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND 
CORPORATIONS 399 (8th ed. 2012).  “Primary market” refers to the aggregate of sales of new issues of securities to 
the public.  BODIE, supra note 33, at 57.  In advocating for passage of the Securities Act, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt told Congress that “[t]his proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine ‘let the 
seller also beware.’  It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest 
dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence.”  H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, at 2 (1933).  The purpose of 
the securities acts was to achieve full disclosure and “a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”  
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).    
40 The “secondary market” is the aggregate trading of previously issued securities among investors. BODIE, supra 
note 33, at 57.   
41 See KLEIN, supra note 39, at 57.  
42 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d (West 2012); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); William F. 
Schneider, Implying Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C. L. REV. 853, 859 
(1984).   
43 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2012).  
44 Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
45 Hill, supra note 9, at 2661. 
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regulations are important because if registration, disclosure, or licensing requirements fail, the 
courts can still protect investors through securities fraud prosecution and litigation.
46
  Section 
10(b) provides in pertinent part that it shall be  
unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors.
47
 
 
In 1942, the SEC exercised its power to promulgate rules under Section 10(b) by issuing Rule 
10b-5 entitled “Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Practices” and providing as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,  
 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
48
 
 
Liability under Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b) is coextensive—that is, both rules necessarily 
prohibit the same conduct.
49
 
C. Implied Private Causes of Action for Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—The 10b-5 
Claim 
 
                                                 
46 See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 11; see also Keith A. Rowley, Cause of Action for Securities Fraud Under 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act and/or Rule 10b-5, 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 271 § 1 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are “catch all” provisions designed to protect investors from situations not covered by 
other provisions); A.S. Goldman & Co., Inc. v. N.J. Bureau of Sec., 163 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining 
that securities registration laws are intended to prevent fraud before it happens).  
47 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2012). 
48 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
49 United Stated v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). 
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The efficacy of securities fraud regulations depends almost entirely upon the 
effectiveness of the governmental entity chosen for enforcement, here, the SEC and federal 
courts.
50
  Perhaps to that end, in 1946, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania recognized an implied private cause of action
51
 under Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 (the private cause of action is hereinafter referred to as the 
“10b-5 claim”).52  In 1971, the United States Supreme Court first affirmed the implied private 
cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
53
  Since 1946, 10b-5 claims have grown 
from a “legislative acorn” into a “judicial oak”54 that is arguably the most important private right 
of action in United States securities law today.
55
  
Because the private cause of action is not a Congressional product, it has fallen to the 
courts to determine the elements of a 10b-5 claim.
56
  As it now stands, the basic elements are: (1) 
a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.
57
  Because knowledge of the 
requisite elements in a Rule 10b-5 private cause of action is helpful in understanding why post-
disclosure price recovery should not negate an inference of economic loss, this section sets forth 
a brief description of the elements. 
1. Materiality  
                                                 
50 See MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 11. 
51 A “private cause of action” refers to “the right of a private party to seek judicial relief from injuries caused by 
another’s violation of a” statutorily imposed duty.  Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979) (Powell, J., 
dissenting).  The general idea is that if a statute is enacted to protect the interests of certain individuals, such 
individuals, when injured by a violation of the statutorily imposed duty, are entitled to recover damages caused 
thereby.  Schneider, supra note 42, at 861–62.   
52 See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
53 Superintendent of Ins. of State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). 
54 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
55 See KLEIN, supra note 39, at 433.  
56 See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-Based Securities Suits Post-
Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 33 (2008); Gordon, supra note 5, at 62. 
57 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008); Gasner v. Bd. of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1996).  
 9 
To be actionable under Rule 10b-5, a misrepresentation must be material.
58
  Materiality is 
determined from the viewpoint of the investor.
59
  Under Rule 10b-5, a misrepresentation or 
omission is material if there is a “substantial likelihood” that proper disclosure “would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”60  Where the impact of certain factual circumstances on a corporation is “certain and 
clear,” the materiality of disclosure is relatively easy to ascertain.61  In contrast, where the 
pertinent information includes “subjective analysis or extrapolation,” 62  the materiality of 
disclosure is more difficult to determine
63
 and requires a detailed factual analysis.
64
  For 
example, in Basic v. Levinson, the Supreme Court held that the materiality of the nondisclosure 
of merger negotiations depends on the likelihood that the event will take place and the expected 
magnitude of the event relative to the totality of the business’s activity.65  
2. Scienter 
Scienter is a prerequisite to liability under Rule 10b-5.
66
  Put simply, scienter is a 
wrongful state of mind.
67
  The Supreme Court has defined scienter in the Rule 10b-5 context as 
“a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”68  To prove scienter under 
Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant (1) knew that the representation was 
false or that the omission would render disclosed information untrue,
69
 (2) or made the 
                                                 
58 Dura, 544 U.S. at 341; see also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
59 Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 
723, 728 (1989). 
60 TSC, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (“We now expressly adopt the TSC 
Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.”). 
61 Basic, 485 U.S. at 232. 
62 Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1989). 
63 Basic, 485 U.S. at 232. 
64 See, e.g., id. at 238. 
65 Id. (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)). 
66 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 2012); TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449–50 (1976). 
67 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 441–42 (2005).  
68 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 n.12 (1976). 
69 See id. at 212–14. 
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representation or omission with reckless disregard as to its truthfulness or lack thereof.
70
  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has defined “recklessness” in the Section 
10(b) context as “highly unreasonable” conduct constituting “an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care” that creates such a danger of misleading investors that the defendant 
either knew or should have known about it.
71
  Mere negligence—that is, mere departure from an 
ordinary standard of care—will not support civil liability under Rule 10b-5.72    
3. Reliance 
 Under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must establish that he relied on the defendant’s 
misrepresentation.
73
  Reliance, also known as “transaction causation” in the Rule 10b-5 
context,
74
 is established by proving that the defendant’s misrepresentation either caused, or was a 
substantial factor contributing to, the plaintiff’s purchase or sale of the relevant securities.75  
Most of the circuits require the plaintiff to prove that his reliance on the defendant’s 
misrepresentation was “reasonable” or “justifiable.”76  The plaintiff is required to prove that 
although other factors may have induced his transaction,
77
 absent the misrepresentation or 
                                                 
70 See Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 618 (1991); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 
575 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982). 
71 Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Franke v. Midwestern 
Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).  
72 See Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 (holding that Congress’ use of the words “manipulative,” “device,” and “contrivance” 
in Section 10(b) indicates the lack of an intent to prohibit mere negligence).  
73 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (2013); TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449–50 (1976).    
74 See, e.g., Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 728–29 (2d Cir. 1992).  
75 See, e.g., Healey v. Chelsea Resources, Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1991) (providing substantial factor test); 
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 976 (1975). 
76 See, e.g., Paracor Fin. v. GE Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996); Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 
337, 342 (2d Cir. 1996); Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 79 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 
S.Ct. 86 (U.S. 1996); Haralson v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 919 F.2d 1014, 1025 (5th Cir. 1990); One-O-One Enters., 
Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 
1987); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983). 
77 Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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omission he would not have been so induced
78
 or would have otherwise prevented the loss 
caused thereby.
79
 
 A 10b-5 plaintiff may rely upon a rebuttable presumption of reliance if (1) the claim is 
based on the defendant’s material omission,80 or (2) the plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s 
misconduct constituted a “fraud on the market.”81  Under the “fraud on the market” theory, 
where misrepresentations are disseminated into an “impersonal” and “well-developed” financial 
market, the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of proving individual reliance.
82
  Rather than 
relying on the defendant’s misrepresentation, the plaintiff benefits from the presumption that he 
relied upon the integrity of the security’s market price. 83   The defendant may rebut the 
presumption by proving that (1) the misrepresentation had no affect on the market price, (2) the 
plaintiff knew of the misrepresentation, or (3) had the plaintiff known of the misrepresentation, 
he still would have traded at the same price.
84
  The fraud on the market rule is premised on the 
theory that in an efficient market, share price is predicated on all information available to the 
market, including any misrepresentations.
85
  Consequently, misrepresentations may defraud 
investors even if not directly relied upon.
86
 
4. Economic Loss 
                                                 
78 See Competitive Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir. 1974).  
79 See Madison Consultants v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1983); IIT, Int’l Inv. Trust v. 
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980).   
80 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–154 (1972); Du Pont v. Brady, 828 F.2d 75, 78 
(2d Cir. 1987); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975); 
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
81 See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988). 
82 Id. (holding so and noting that nearly every court to consider the issue has also held as such). 
83 See id.; Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 748 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Blech Sec. 
Litig., 961 F. Supp. 569, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
84 Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248–49). 
85 Basic, 485 U.S. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
86 Id. 
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 A 10b-5 plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s misrepresentation proximately 
caused an economic loss and the extent of damages caused thereby.
87
  In determining the extent 
of economic loss under Rule 10b-5, courts have applied Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act.
88
  
Section 28(a) provides that “[n]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the 
provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in 1 or more actions, a 
total amount in excess of the actual damages to that person on account of the act complained 
of.”89 
 Section 28(a) is now commonly understood to require application of the out-of-pocket 
measure of damages in Rule 10b-5 cases.
90
  Under the out-of-pocket rule, the plaintiff’s damages 
equal the difference between what he paid for the securities and their actual value on the date of 
purchase—that is, the value of the securities absent the fraud.91  Although the elements of a 10b-
5 claim generally, and the out-of-pocket rule specifically, are borrowed from the tort actions of 
deceit and misrepresentation,
92
 there are important differences.
93
   
                                                 
87 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345–46 (2005); Litton, 967 F.2d at 747; Schlick v. Penn-Dixie 
Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). 
88 Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc., 813 F.2d 296, 301 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987); 
Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989). 
89 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(a) (West 2012). 
90 See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (while considering a 10b-5 claim, 
holding that the correct measure of damages under Section 28 of the Exchange Act is the out-of-pocket rule); 
Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings, Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “[t]raditionally, 
economic loss in Section 10(b) cases has been determined by use of the “out-of-pocket” measure for damages.”); 
Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991); Huddleston v. Herman & MacClean 640 F.2d 
534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Duralite Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 577, 586 (3d Cir. 1975); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 
F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971); Kaufman v. Mellon Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 336 F.2d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 1966); 
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Estate Counseling Serv., 
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).  But see Pelletier v. Stuart-
James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying benefit of the bargain measure of damages); Hackbart v. 
Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 1982) (same); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(same); John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1971) (same).  
91 See, e.g., Affiliated, 406 U.S. at 155; Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786. 
92 See Dura, 544 U.S. 336, 336 (2005) (noting that, in many ways, a 10b-5 claim resembles the common law tort 
action of deceit and misrepresentation); Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224–25 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that in 
10b-5 cases, federal courts employ an out-of-pocket measure of damages borrowed from the tort action of deceit); 
see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 549 (1938) (outlining the measure of damages for a deceit action). 
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In a typical deceit action, the seller’s misrepresentation is directed solely at the buyer or a 
small group of prospective buyers, rather than at the public at large.
94
  Consequently, the value of 
the transferred property is readily ascertainable by looking to the open market.
95
  The same is not 
true for “fraud on the market” cases because the misrepresentation is directed at substantially all 
potential buyers and thus affects the market price.
96
  The true value of the securities at the time 
of the transaction must therefore be ascertained ex post by examining the behavior of the market 
price in the period immediately following public disclosure of the fraud.
97
  In sum, when 
calculating Rule 10b-5 damages in a “fraud on the market” case, the important factors are the 
plaintiff’s purchase price and any consequent post-disclosure price fluctuations.98  Even so, the 
aim of the damages analysis is ascertaining how much more the plaintiff was deceived into 
paying on the date of purchase due to the defendant’s fraud. 
In 1995, Congress passed, over President William Clinton’s veto,99 the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),
100
 which, inter alia, capped a 10b-5 plaintiff’s damages at the 
difference between the plaintiff’s purchase price and the average trading price of that security 
during the 90-day period (“look back period”) after the corrective disclosure (this statutory 
damages cap is hereinafter referred to as the “look back provision”).101  The purpose of the look 
                                                                                                                                                             
93 Cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243–44 (1988) (“The modern securities markets, literally involving 
millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions contemplated by early fraud cases, 
and our understanding of Rule 10b-5’s reliance requirement must encompass these differences.”). 
94 Harris, 523 F.2d 225–26. 
95 Id. at 226. 
96 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 549 cmt. c (1983)).  
97 Id.  
98 See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that in a 10b-5 claim, the plaintiff’s 
damages are generally the difference between the price paid for the securities and the price of the securities on the 
day the public becomes aware of the fraud). 
99 Rowley, supra note 46, § 3.  
100 Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
101 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(e)(1) (West 2012). 
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back provision is to limit damages to losses caused by the fraud, rather than losses caused by 
other market conditions.
102
   
In drafting the look back provision, Congress was cognizant of the fact that 
calculating damages based on the security’s price on the day of the corrective disclosure 
often risks substantially overstating damages.
103
  Research suggests that markets often 
overreact when fraud is revealed, and the price at which the security trades immediately 
following disclosure may not reflect its true value.
104
  Hence, the look back provision 
gives the security an opportunity to recover following a possible market overreaction to a 
corrective disclosure.
105
   
The look back provision, however, is an imperfect solution to the problem of 
market overreaction because it caps damages regardless of whether the price recovery 
was actually a market correction to an initial overreaction.
106
  Besides capping damages 
at the mean trading price of the security over the ninety days following the corrective 
disclosure, the look back provision did not otherwise alter the traditional out-of-pocket 
measure of damages calculation.
107
 
5. Loss Causation 
                                                 
102 H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
103 Id. 
104 See Baruch Lev & Meiring  de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy 
Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 10 (1994) (“immediately following an important negative corporate announcement, 
and sometimes for several days thereafter, share price may not reflect a firm’s true value”).  
105 See In re Veritas Software Corp. Sec. Litig. 494 F.3d 962, 967 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003); Richard C. Phillips & Gilbert 
C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for 
Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LWYR. 1009, 1060 (1996). 
106 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(e) (West 2012); see also Denis T. Rice, A Practitioner’s View of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 283, 301 (1997). 
107 Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 39 (2012) (citing In re Royal Dutch/Shell 
Trans. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609–10 (D.N.J. 2005)). 
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 The PSLRA also codified the judicially mandated Rule 10b-5 loss causation 
requirement
108
 by providing that in private actions arising under the Exchange Act, “the plaintiff 
shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this 
chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”109  Courts require a 
showing of loss causation—that is, a causal connection between the corporation’s 
misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s economic loss—to prevent Rule 10b-5 from becoming a 
form of investor insurance.
110
 
Until 2005, although the circuits agreed that a 10b-5 plaintiff must establish loss 
causation, they disagreed about the governing legal standard.
111
  The stricter majority view 
required a 10b-5 plaintiff to plead and prove that the disclosure of a company’s fraud caused a 
price decline.
112
  The minority view held that a 10b-5 plaintiff must merely establish that the 
defendant’s fraud artificially inflated the plaintiff’s purchase price.113 
 In 2005, the United States Supreme Court ended the circuit split regarding the Rule 10b-5 
loss causation standard with its unanimous, landmark decision, Dura Pharmaceuticals.
114
  The 
Supreme Court held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a 10b-5 plaintiff must allege a post-
disclosure depreciation in the value of the security, rather than mere purchase price inflation.
115
  
The Dura complaint alleged that Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Dura”) misrepresented the 
likelihood of Food and Drug Administration approval of a novel asthmatic spray device, causing 
                                                 
108 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
109 15 U.S.C.A § 78u-4(b)(4) (West 2012). 
110 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005); Rousseff v. E.F. Hutton Co., 843 F.2d 1326, 1329 
(11th Cir. 1988).  
111 Escoffery, supra note 11, at 1781.  
112 Id. at 1782. 
113 Id.  
114 Dura, 544 U.S. 336. 
115 Id. at 344. 
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the plaintiffs to buy Dura stock at an artificially inflated price and thereby suffer damages.
116
  
Considering a motion to dismiss, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court and, applying the minority rule, held that the complaint adequately 
plead loss causation.
117
 
 In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court noted two reasons why a 10b-5 
plaintiff must allege actual economic loss, rather than mere purchase price inflation.
118
  First, at 
the time of the transaction, the court noted, any fraudulently caused price inflation is offset by 
the fact that the investor owns a highly liquid security that is still worth the inflated price.
119
  
Second, from a policy standpoint, the Ninth Circuit’s holding would transform the 10b-5 claim 
into a form of investor insurance when, instead, it was provided to compensate investors for 
actual and consequent losses suffered.
120
   
The Supreme Court noted that while an inflated purchase price may be a prerequisite to a 
consequent depreciation, such depreciation is not inevitable.
121
  For example, the investor might 
sell the securities before the corrective disclosure and thus not suffer any consequent economic 
loss.
122
  Even if the investor holds the securities and experiences a post-disclosure depreciation, 
the depreciation could be attributable to unrelated events such as changed economic 
circumstances.
123
  Importantly, the Court commented that “[t]he same is true in respect to a claim 
that a share’s higher price is lower than it otherwise would have been.”124  In other words, a post-
disclosure price increase may not be attributable to a market correction subsequent to a post-
                                                 
116 Id. at 336–40. 
117 Id. at 340. 
118 Id. at 342–345. 
119 Id. at 342. 
120 Dura, 544 U.S. at 345. 
121 Id. at 345. 
122 Id. at 342. 
123 Id. at 342–43. 
124 Id. at 343. 
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disclosure market overreaction.  The Supreme Court gave lower courts guidance by positing that 
the greater the amount of time that has elapsed after the corrective disclosure, the more likely it 
is that factors unrelated to the disclosure caused the price fluctuation.
125
 
In contrast to subsequent judicial interpretations, the Supreme Court’s Dura decision 
sought merely to enforce the Rule 10b-5 elements of economic loss and loss causation by 
requiring plaintiffs to plead more than an inflated purchase price.  The Dura Court intended to 
require 10b-5 plaintiffs to plead a post-disclosure depreciation and a casual connection between 
the depreciation and the fraud.
126
 
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF DURA TO POST-DISCLOSURE PRICE RECOVERIES 
A. The Pre-China North District Courts 
Since 2005, at least six United States District Court decisions have interpreted Dura to 
require courts to dismiss 10b-5 complaints for lack of economic loss if the plaintiff could have 
sold his shares for a profit after the truth reached the market.
127
  This Subsection examines the 
decisions and the development of this remarkable extension of the Supreme Court’s Dura 
holding. 
1. Malin v. XL Capital Ltd. 
                                                 
125 Id. at 343.  
126 Dura, 544 U.S. at 347 (holding that Rule 10b-5 complaints must provide the defendant “with some indication of 
the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind”). 
127 In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:09-CV-2351-TWT, 2011 WL 2619092 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2011), reh’g 
denied, 2011 WL 3844221 (Aug. 29, 2011); In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 
351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Acticon, 692 F.3d 34; In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-
01695 (CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007), abrogated by Acticon, 692 F.3d 34; Ross v. 
Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2009); In re Estee Lauder Companies Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 2505 (LAK), 
2007 WL 1522620 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2007), abrogated by Acticon, 692 F.3d 34; Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No. 
3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005), abrogated by Acticon AG v. China N.E. 
Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012).    
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Malin v. XL Capital Ltd. was the first case to preclude recovery in a Rule 10b-5 action 
due to a post, disclosure price recovery.
128
  Likely seeking to avoid Dura’s ambit, the Malin 
complaint, filed with the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleged 
price inflation, a disclosure, a subsequent depreciation, and a causal connection between the 
disclosure and the depreciation.
129
  In response, XL Capital Ltd. (“XL”) filed a motion to dismiss 
the complaint
130
 on the grounds that, under Dura, the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead loss 
causation because although share price declined after disclosure of the fraud, the price fully 
recovered prior to the plaintiffs’ sale, which negated the inference of economic loss.131    
The court noted that the plaintiffs’ stated intention to prove a causal connection between 
a post-disclosure price decline and the disclosure met the pleading requirement articulated in 
Dura.
132
  Nevertheless, the court equated price decline without loss realization to mere price 
inflation, which the Supreme Court rejected as inadequate in Dura.
133
  Consequently, the court 
held that the stock’s post-disclosure increase over the pre-disclosure price negated the requisite 
inference of economic loss and as a result the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.134 
2. In re Estee Lauder Companies Securities Litigation 
Two years later, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
followed suit in In re Estee Lauder Companies Security Litigation.
135
  In that case, the complaint 
alleged that Estee Lauder’s stock price was artificially inflated due to “false and misleading” 
                                                 
128 Malin, 2005 WL 2146089. 
129 Id. at *3. 
130 Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Based Upon Recent Supreme Court Authority Showing Lack of Appearing Plaintiffs' Standing to Assert a Claim 
Under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, Malin, 2005 WL 2146089 (No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD), 2005 WL 2181534.  
131 Id. at 2. 
132 Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *3. 
133 Id. at *4. 
134 Id.   
135 In re Estee Lauder Companies Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 2505 (LAK), 2007 WL 1522620 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 
2007), abrogated by Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings, Ltd., 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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company statements beginning in April 2005, that were intended to prop up the share price while 
insiders unloaded their stock.
136
  The complaint alleged that Estee Lauder made two corrective 
disclosures on September 19, 2005, and October 26, 2005, revealing that the company was not 
performing as well as it had earlier represented.
137
  The first disclosure was accompanied by a 
price decline from $40.51 to $36.05 per share, and upon the second disclosure, the share price 
declined further to $30.71.
138
  
In ruling upon Estee Lauder’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the complaint failed 
to adequately plead loss causation, as a matter of law, solely because the lead plaintiff could have 
sold his shares at a profit in 2006, after disclosure of the fraud.
139
  Perplexingly, the court opined 
that the plaintiff’s argument that a sharp post-disclosure price decline constituted an economic 
loss was unpersuasive.
140
  
3. In re Veeco Instruments, Incorporated Securities Litigation 
Later that year, in In re Veeco Instruments, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York considered a 10b-5 defendant’s motion to exclude from the 
damages calculation (1) any shares not yet sold by the plaintiffs, and (2) any shares sold after the 
corrective disclosure at a price equal to or greater than the plaintiff’s purchase price. 141  
Regarding the shares not yet sold by the plaintiffs, the court noted that “neither the PSLRA nor 
[Dura] imposes such a ‘sell-to-sue’ requirement”142 and held that such shares were not ipso facto 
                                                 
136 Class Action Complaint for Violation Federal Securities Laws at 3, Estee Lauder, 2007 WL 1522620 (No. 06 
Civ. 2505 (LAK)), 2006 WL 1128020. 
137 Id. at *3. 
138 Id.  
139 Estee Lauder, 2007 WL 1522620, at *1.  
140 Id. at *2 n.5.  
141 In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-01695 (CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 28, 2007), abrogated by Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012). 
142 Id. at *7. 
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to be excluded from the damages calculation.
143
  Regarding the shares sold post-disclosure for a 
profit, the court cited the Malin extension of Dura with approval and held that shares that could 
have been sold at a profit to the plaintiff were to be excluded from the damages calculation.
144
 
The court further noted that if at any point prior to the final calculation of damages the stock 
price rose above the plaintiff’s initial purchase price, that share would be excluded from the 
damages calculation.
145
  
4. Ross v. Walton & In re Immucor, Incorporated Securities Litigation Apply the Malin Rule 
Outside the Second Circuit 
 
In the 2009 case Ross v. Walton, the Malin rule was for the first time adopted outside the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
146
  On January 9, 2007, an indictment 
against Patrick J. Harrington, Executive Vice President of Business Loan Express (“BLX”) was 
unsealed in a federal district court.
147
  Two days later, BLX’s parent corporation, Allied, issued a 
press release disclosing the Harrington indictment.
148
  Later that day, Allied’s stock fell more 
than $2 to close at $29.40 per share on ten times its average trading volume.
149
  Purchasers of 
Allied stock subsequently brought a class action against Allied under Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.
150
  
The Ross complaint alleged that Allied failed to disclose that its financial condition was 
inflated by the reporting of income by BLX, its subsidiary, obtained through the fraudulent loans 
outlined in the Harrington indictment.
151
  In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the “[d]efendants 
misrepresented the nature and the scope of the government investigations” into the Allied/BLX 
                                                 
143 Id.  
144 Id. 
145 Id. at *7.  
146 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Malin and Estee Lauder with approval).  
147 Id. at 35–36.  
148 Id. at 36. 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 35. 
151 Id. at 36. 
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unlawful loan scheme.
152
  The complaint alleged the two dollars per share price decline as the 
plaintiffs’ economic loss and that it was caused by disclosure of the Harrington indictment earlier 
that day.
153
 
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint because, among other alleged defects, the 
defendant claimed that the plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded economic loss or loss 
causation.
154
  The relevant portion of Allied’s motion to dismiss rested on the argument that 
because Allied stock was trading above the lead plaintiff’s purchase price one month before 
filing of the complaint, the plaintiff did not suffer an actual economic loss.
155
 
The court noted that under the traditional out-of-pocket rule and the PSLRA look back 
provision, a purchaser’s loss could be calculated by reference to the amount of overpayment 
without requiring a sale of the stock.
156
  Similar to the Veeco Instruments court, Judge Shanstrom 
recognized that neither United States Supreme Court precedent nor Congressional acts required a 
10b-5 plaintiff to sell his stock prior to bringing suit.
157
  Nevertheless, the court held that the lead 
plaintiff had not suffered an economic loss because he could have sold the shares at a profit 
during June 2007, about six months after the initial disclosure.
158
  Judge Shanstrom did not 
address the possibility that gains six months after the corrective disclosure may be completely 
unrelated to the fraud or any post-overreaction market correction.  Puzzlingly, given the out-of-
pocket measure of damages, the court went as far as to say that “[l]ogically, a plaintiff can not 
                                                 
152 Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 36. 
153 Id. at 36. 
154 Id. at 35.  
155 Id. at 42. 
156 Id. at 42. 
157 Id. at 42. 
158 Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 43. 
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demonstrate the amount the purchaser overpaid if the stock value rose greater than the purchase 
price on multiple occasions.”159  Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint.160 
 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia also applied the 
Malin rule in In re Immucor on a motion to dismiss a 10b-5 complaint.
161
  The court correctly 
restated the Dura economic loss standard by providing that “[i]n effect, [the loss causation] 
element requires the plaintiff to allege that the security's share price ‘fell significantly after the 
truth became known.’”162  The court nevertheless held that despite post-disclosure price decline, 
the plaintiff failed to adequately plead economic loss and loss causation because the lead plaintiff 
could have sold its shares for a profit in the months following the corrective disclosure.
163
 
B. The Southern District of New York’s Continuation of the Malin Rule in China North and the 
Second Circuit’s Reversal in Acticon 
 
1. In re China North East Petroleum Holdings Limited Securities Litigation 
 
On June 11, 2010, purchasers of China North East Petroleum Holdings Limited (“China 
North”) stock filed a class action suit against the company in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York alleging violations of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5.
164
  China 
North is an American corporation
165
 that engages in crude oil extraction in China and produces 
petroleum.
166
  Acticon AG (“Acticon”), the lead plaintiff, alleged that beginning on May 15, 
                                                 
159 Id. at 43. 
160 Id. at 44. 
161 No. 1:09-CV-2351-TWT, 2011 WL 2619092 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2011), reh’g denied, 2011 WL 3844221 (Aug. 
29, 2011).  
162 Id. at *4. (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).  
163 Id. at *4 (citing Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 43).  
164 Class Action Complaint at 2, In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Securities Litigation, 819 F. Supp. 2d 
351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10 Civ. 4577(MGC)), 2010 WL 2483602. 
165 Id. at 3. 
166 Wall St. Journal, China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., Company & People, WALL ST. J. (last visited Sept. 15, 
2012), http://quotes.wsj.com/CNEP/company-people.  
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2008, China North “misled investors about its reported earnings, oil reserves, and internal 
controls.”167 
From January 20, 2010, through May 17, 2010, Acticon purchased 60,000 shares of 
China North for a total of $434,950, an average purchase price of $7.25 per share.
168
  Beginning 
in February 2010, China North made multiple disclosures.
169
  On February 23, 2010, China 
North “announced that it was withdrawing its 2008 and 2009 financial statements.”170  China 
North then announced on April 15, 2010, “that it was facing delisting by the New York Stock 
Exchange . . . and that there were certain deficiencies in its internal controls.”171  On April 20, 
2010, China North announced “a downward estimate of its earnings and linked its need to do so 
to its misvaluation of oil and gas properties.”172  China North’s stock price declined sharply 
following each of these disclosures.
173
 
The NYSE halted trading of China North’s stock on May 25, 2010.174  Two days later, 
China North announced that certain managers had resigned for “financial improprieties.” 175  
During the summer of 2010, the chairman of China North’s audit committee announced his 
resignation because he had concerns about whether China North’s 2009 financial statements 
comported with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and about whether China North 
personnel had bribed foreign governmental officials.
176
  On September 9, 2010, China North 
                                                 
167 Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings, Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2012). 
168 China North, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
169 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 36. 
170 Id. at 36. 
171 Id. at 36. 
172 Id. at 36. 
173 Id. at 36. 
174 See id. at 36. 
175 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 36. 
176 Id. at 36. 
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stock resumed trading and declined in value approximately twenty percent on very high 
volume.
177
   
On March 22, 2011, China North moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the 
grounds that its allegations did not adequately plead economic loss because, due to a rebound in 
the share price after China North’s final corrective disclosure, Acticon could have sold its stock 
at a profit.
178
  The court correctly noted that, under Dura, in addition to price inflation, a 10b-5 
plaintiff must allege a post-disclosure decline in share price.
179
  The court then pointed out that 
federal courts have interpreted Dura to require, as a matter of law, that a 10b-5 plaintiff does not 
suffer an economic loss if his stock’s post-disclosure price has risen above his purchase price—
“even if that price had initially fallen after the corrective disclosure was made.”180  Since there 
were twelve days in October and November of 2010 when Acticon could have sold at an overall 
profit, the court held that its unquestionable loss
181
 could not be imputed to any of China North’s 
alleged fraud.
182
  Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint.
183
 
2. Acticon AG v. China North East Petroleum Holdings Limited  
In hearing Acticon’s appeal, the Second Circuit became the first United States Court of 
Appeals to decide whether an increase in share price to above the plaintiff’s average purchase 
price after the issuer’s corrective disclosure precludes an inference that the plaintiff suffered an 
economic loss attributable to the issuer’s alleged misrepresentation. 184   The Second Circuit 
                                                 
177 Id. at 36. 
178 Id. at 36–37. 
179 In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
180 Id. at 352. 
181 Acticon sold its shares for a loss at prices ranging from $3.50 to $6.33 per share between December 2010 and 
May 2011.  Id. at 353. 
182 Id.  
183 Id. at 354. 
184 Wolff, supra note 19.  Although Acticon is a case of first impression, in 1975, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit decided a similar issue using like reasoning.  In Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., the plaintiff investor 
alleged that defendant, AIC, published false and misleading statements that, when corrected, caused him to suffer an 
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reversed the district court because its holding (as well as the other district courts on which it 
relied) was inconsistent with the Supreme Court-sanctioned out-of-pocket measure of damages 
and the congressionally-imposed PSLRA look back provision.
185
 
The Second Circuit explained that the district court’s holding was flawed because, unlike 
the out-of-pocket rule, it failed to make the plaintiff whole by allowing recovery of the difference 
between what the plaintiff paid for the security and its actual worth on the date of purchase.
186
  
The Second Circuit noted that the Malin Court extrapolated the Dura holding by equating a post-
disclosure price recovery to pre-disclosure price inflation itself, which the Supreme Court had 
rejected as inadequate to plead economic loss under Rule 10b-5.
187
  The Second Circuit 
disagreed with the Malin holding because it equated “two snapshots of the plaintiff’s economic 
situation” without considering intervening events.188   
The Second Circuit noted that the Malin line of cases assumed, without examination, that 
any intervening losses could be offset by intervening gains.
189
  The court opined, however, that 
offsetting fraudulently-caused losses with completely unrelated gains is improper because, 
                                                                                                                                                             
economic loss in violation of § 10b of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.  523 F.2d 220, 222–224 (8th Cir. 1975).  
The district court granted AIC’s motion to dismiss the complaint and held that the plaintiff failed to mitigate his 
damages because he could have sold for a profit after information correcting the fraud had been disseminated into 
the market.  Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 378 F. Supp. 894, 900 (E.D. Mo. 1974), rev’d, 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975).  On 
appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted that under the out-of-pocket measure of damages used in 10b-5 cases, the plaintiff 
could establish a basis for damages either by presenting evidence that AIC stock was inflated at the time of purchase 
(this method of establishing economic loss was subsequently abrogated in Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 
336, 344 (2005)) or that the price of AIC stock decreased on the date of public discovery of the fraud.  Neither 
method of establishing damages took account of post-disclosure price recovery.  The court, pointing to the lack of a 
common law sell-to-sue requirement in securities fraud actions, held that the plaintiff was not under a duty to sell his 
stock, “for mitigation of damages or any other purpose,” before commencing the action.  Harris, 523 F.2d at 227.  
The court noted that it would be unfair to force a long-term investor to sell the securities for the benefit of the 
defendant.  Id. at 228.  The court further noted that the defendant may not take advantage of any price declines 
subsequent to the date on which damages are to be assessed—that is, the date on which the general public becomes 
aware of the fraud—and thus it would be inappropriate to allow the plaintiff to take advantage of subsequent price 
increases.  Id. 
185 Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings, Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 2012). 
186 Id.  
187 Id.  
188 Id.  
189 Id.  
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absent the fraud, the plaintiff would have purchased the uninflated stock and benefited from the 
unrelated gain.
190
 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit held that the Malin rule was inconsistent with the 
PSLRA look back provision, which caps the traditional out-of-pocket recovery at the mean price 
over the ninety days following the final disclosure.
191
  The court noted that Congress adopted the 
look back provision because of the danger that calculating damages based on share price on the 
day of disclosure may substantially overestimate the plaintiff’s damages.192  The Second Circuit 
found it compelling that the look back provision, which attempts to limit the plaintiff’s damages 
to those caused by the defendant’s fraud, stops well short of the limitation imposed by the Malin 
line of cases.
193
 
The Second Circuit decided that Acticon had adequately pleaded economic loss and loss 
causation under Dura because it had alleged an inflated purchase price and that China North’s 
share price dropped after the corrective disclosures.
194
  The court indicated, however, that later in 
the litigation the district court would have to determine whether the price rebound was the 
market’s correction to an initial overreaction to the fraud or whether the gains were unrelated.195  
Since at this stage, a relatedness determination was premature, the rebound could not, as a matter 
of law, negate the inference that the plaintiff had suffered an economic loss.
196
  Consequently, 
the court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.197 
                                                 
190 Id.  
191 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39–41; In re Royal Dutch/Shell Trans. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609–10 (D.N.J. 
2005) (noting that the look back provision is consistent with, and besides the cap, did not otherwise alter, the out of 
pocket rule).  
192 Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104–98, at 20 (1995)).  
193 Id. at 41.   
194 Id. at 40. 
195 Id. at 41.  
196 Id.   
197 Id. at 40–41.  
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IV. A POST-DISCLOSURE REBOUND SHOULD NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, NEGATE AN 
INFERENCE OF ECONOMIC LOSS 
 
A. The Malin Rule Imposes an Unjustified De Facto Sell to Sue Requirement Because the 
Plaintiff’s Decision to Sell His Stock Can Instead Be Thought of as a Second Investment 
Decision 
 
Courts have generally adopted the notion that a plaintiff is not required to sell his shares 
prior to bringing suit under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 (i.e., there is no Rule 10b-5 “sell-to-
sue” requirement).198  Even at common law, a defrauded investor was not obligated to sell his 
securities prior to bringing an action for deceit.
199
  Although many of the courts in the Malin line 
of cases expressly recognized that there is no sell-to-sue requirement to bring a Rule 10b-5 
claim,
200
 their holdings effectively imposed one.  Under Malin, a rational plaintiff would sell his 
stock prior to bringing his 10b-5 claim for fear that a price recovery may render his claim moot 
at any point in the litigation.
201
   
A sell-to-sue requirement is, however, logically unnecessary because neither the out-of-
pocket measure of damages nor the look back provision takes account of the investor’s ultimate 
sale price.  Furthermore, the plaintiff’s decision not to sell his stock after disclosure of the fraud 
can be viewed as a second investment decision, unrelated to his initial investment decision to 
purchase the stock.
202
  The plaintiff could, presumably, usurp the Malin rule through a post-
                                                 
198 See Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 227 (8th Cir. 1975); Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 
2009); In re Royal Dutch/Shell Tran. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 610 (D.N.J. 2005); Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 
3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005).  But see Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th 
Cir. 1970) (same); Cooper v. Garza, 431 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1970) (imposing a now abrogated sell-to-sue 
requirement); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2nd Cir. 1968) (same). 
199 See Hindman v. First National Bank, 112 F. 931, 935-36 (6th Cir.), Cert. denied, 186 U.S. 483, 22 S.Ct. 943, 46 
L.Ed. 1261 (1902); Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 84, 159 N.E. 870, 872 (1928); Stephens v. Wheeler, 
193 Wis. 164, 213 N.W. 464, 468 (1927).   
200 See, e.g., In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-01695 (CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007), abrogated by Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 
2012); Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2009). 
201 Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4. 
202 See, e.g., Harris, 523 F.2d at 228 (holding that price fluctuations that occur after the plaintiff’s second investment 
decision to hold the stock, unrelated to his first investment decision to purchase the stock, have no bearing on the 
plaintiff’s damages); Acticon, 692 F.3d at 41 (quoting Harris, 523 F.2d at 228). 
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disclosure sale of his stock to recognize a loss and then immediate repurchase of the same 
number of shares on the open market.  Thus, it is unfair to force the defrauded, long-term 
investor to sell his stock for the benefit of the defendant.   
B. Imposing a De Facto Sell to Sue Requirement is Inefficient 
Imposing a de facto sell-to-sue requirement is inefficient because it increases the 
transaction costs of a long-term investor who preserves his 10b-5 claim through a sale and then 
immediate repurchase of the same number of shares.  This increase in transaction costs is 
unnecessary because neither the out-of-pocket measure of damages nor the look back provision 
takes account of the investor’s ultimate sale price.203   
To illustrate, suppose that a fictional court, the United States Court of Appeal for the 
Fourteenth Circuit, recently held in Nilam that plaintiffs who could have sold their stock for a 
profit after the fraud became known cannot allege the requisite economic loss in a 10b-5 claim.  
The State of West Dakota is in the Fourteenth Circuit.  West Dakota residents, Bob and Steve, 
both purchase 10,000 shares of ABC Corporation at the fraudulently inflated price of $100 per 
share.  One month later, ABC announces that it has been fraudulently overstating the amount of 
its oil reserves for the past three years.  Immediately following the disclosure, ABC’s stock price 
declines to $75 per share.  
Bob thinks that although ABC has made mistakes, it is a tenacious company that will 
bounce back and eventually enable him to sell at a profit.  Bob, however, is a securities litigation 
lawyer familiar with Nilam and knows to sell his shares as soon as possible to preserve his claim 
in case the stock experiences a quick recovery.  Thus, Bob calls his broker Gary and says, “I 
                                                 
203 See Harris, 523 F.2d at 226 (citing Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104–05 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 928 (1969)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that in a 10b-5 claim, the 
plaintiff’s damages are generally the difference between the price paid for the securities and the price of the 
securities on the day the public becomes aware of the fraud). 
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want you to sell my 10,000 shares of ABC and then immediately buy 10,000 shares of ABC.”  
Gary gets out his pocket calculator and realizes that he will make $200 for simply entering the 
orders.   
Such a sale and immediate repurchase, Bob knows, will ensure the preservation of his 
right to compensation and enable him to take advantage of subsequent gains he expects to occur 
due to the strength of ABC’s other ventures.  Gary makes the trades for Bob.  At this point, Bob 
and Steve are in the exact same position regarding their ABC stock purchases, the only 
difference is that Bob has paid Gary $200 for the claim-preserving trades.   
A couple of days later, ABC announces that it has discovered a new oil field in the 
country of Strakastan.  Consequently, ABC stock increases to $101 per share.  Two days later, 
however, communists overrun Strakastan, previously an unstable democracy, and seize ABC’s 
oil field.  Upon announcement of ABC’s Strakastan misfortune, ABC share price declines 
sharply to $50 per share, where it remains for the next few years.   
Bob files a class action suit against ABC in the United States District Court for the 
District of West Dakota individually and on behalf of a putative class of ABC investors who 
purchased ABC stock between the time that ABC first began overstating its oil reserve figures 
and the date of the corrective disclosure.  The class action complaint alleged violations of 
Section 10 of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.   
A short time later, Steve receives a form letter from Bob’s law firm notifying him of the 
impending litigation and asking if he would like to join the suit.  Steve acquiesces.  Bob v. ABC 
is assigned to Judge Flakowitz.  ABC files a 10(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.  ABC argues that, under Nilam, because many ABC 
investors could have sold at a profit during the two post-corrective disclosure days immediately 
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following discovery of the Strakastan oil field, the complaint should be dismissed for failure to 
plead economic loss.  Judge Flakowitz examines the relevant documents and notices that the 
class members could be placed into three categories: (1) those who sold before the brief recovery 
and did not rebuy, (2) those who sold before the brief recovery and immediately rebought (Bob 
was the only one), and (3) those who held their shares all the way through the price recovery to 
the further decline.  
In his decision, Judge Flakowitz first notes that the PSLRA look back provision is not 
implicated in this case due to the brevity of the post-disclosure recovery.  Judge Flakowitz denies 
ABC’s motion to dismiss as to all category one plaintiffs.  Then, citing Nilam, Judge Flakowitz 
dismisses all category three class members including Steve because they could have sold their 
shares at a profit following the corrective disclosure.  Furthermore, Judge Flakowitz holds that 
because Bob sold his shares, recognized a loss, and then made a second investment decision to 
purchase ABC shares on the open market, he adequately alleged economic loss and causation.   
After a brief trial, a jury finds for the plaintiffs.  Damages were calculated using the 
commonly accepted out of pocket rule.  For example, in calculating Bob’s damages the Court 
took the difference between what Bob paid for his stock and what his stock was worth following 
the disclosure.  Thus, Bob’s damages were 100 – 75 = $25 per share.  At no point in the entire 
litigation, except for on the motion to dismiss, was Bob’s sale price relevant. The only parties 
that benefited from Judge Flakowitz’s partial grant of ABC’s motion to dismiss were the ABC 
corporation, who had intentionally deceived the investing public, and Bob’s broker, Gary, who 
made $200 for entering two orders necessitated only by the irrational Nilam decision.  
Notice that if ABC had never fraudulently overstated the amount of its oil reserves, Bob 
and Steve’s purchase price would have been around $75.  ABC shareholders still would have 
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benefited from unrelated gains such as the stock appreciation caused by the discovery of oil in 
Strakastan.  Because the $25 depreciation represents the actual reduction in the present value of 
ABC’s future cash flows, rather than merely a market overreaction, it is gone forever.  
Subsequent unrelated appreciation in the value of the stock should not be considered 
compensation to the shareholders; rather, it is profit that ABC shareholders were entitled to 
receive, completely independent of the fraud, due to their investment in ABC stock.  To deprive 
ABC shareholders of these gains, which they experienced by risking their money through 
retention of ABC stock, by renaming it “compensation” is unjust and intolerable.   
C. The Policy Consideration Espoused by the Supreme Court in Dura Does Not Support the 
Malin Rule  
 
  The Dura Court explained that at the time of the initial purchase, any fraudulent price 
inflation is offset by the fact that the investor owns a highly liquid security that is worth the 
inflated price.
204
  At first glance, when taken out of context, it may seem as though the same is 
true of a share that has fully recovered after an initial post-disclosure depreciation.
205
  Upon 
further inspection, however, it becomes clear that the Dura Court sought simply to enforce the 
requirement that a 10b-5 plaintiff plead and prove a consequent economic loss.   
The Dura Court held mere allegations of price inflation insufficient to plead economic 
loss because the stock the investor holds right after purchase is still worth the inflated price, and 
the investor may never experience a consequent depreciation.
206
  According to the Court, the 
investor may not experience a consequent depreciation because he may sell his shares prior to 
                                                 
204 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). 
205 See, e.g., Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089, *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005), 
abrogated by Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a share 
that had increased to above its pre-disclosure value is functionally equivalent to an inflated share price that never 
lost value). 
206 Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
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disclosure,
207
 or any subsequent depreciation may be caused by events unrelated to the alleged 
misrepresentation.
208
   
a. The Double Damages Predicament 
In the case of the investor who sells prior to disclosure, although he may have been 
defrauded into paying more for his shares than they were worth, to allow him to recover would 
force the defendant to pay double damages for those shares.  To see why, suppose that Jack buys 
fraudulently inflated XYZ Corporation stock.  Then, prior to XYZ’s disclosure of their 
fraudulent conduct, Jack sells his XYZ stock to Clementine.  A few days after the sale, XYZ 
reveals that it’s been misrepresenting the likelihood of FDA approval of its novel cancer drug.  
XYZ stock declines sharply immediately following the disclosure.  Although it is likely that 
Clementine has a legitimate 10b-5 claim against XYZ, does Jack?   
To allow Jack to recover even though the furthest his economic loss allegations go is his 
inflated purchase price would force XYZ to pay damages twice on the same shares, once to Jack 
and once to Clementine.  Conversely, allowing a plaintiff who has experienced a post-disclosure 
price decline and then a subsequent unrelated price rebound does not present a double damages 
predicament because the plaintiff must own the stock at the time of disclosure and depreciation.  
b. Solely Unrelated Declines After an Alleged Corrective Disclosure Signal Immateriality or 
Else Prior Disclosure 
 
In the case of a plaintiff whose post-disclosure share price decline is attributable only to 
unrelated events, the misrepresentation was either not material or already known to the public, 
and thus the fraud is not what caused the depreciation. Since materiality and causation are 
elements of a 10b-5 claim,
209
 the Dura Court was correct in asserting unrelated, post-disclosure 
                                                 
207 Id. at 342. 
208 Id. at 342–43 
209 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157. 
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share depreciation as an example of when allowing recovery in a 10b-5 case would be 
inappropriate.         
Thus, ownership of a post-disclosure share that has rebounded due to unrelated events 
does not offset the fact that the plaintiff was sold stock at a fraudulently inflated price in the 
same manner that a pre-disclosure inflated share price does.  As the Dura court pointed out, 
absent the fraud, the plaintiff would have purchased the stock at an uninflated price and 
benefited from the subsequent, unrelated gain.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Courts require a 10b-5 plaintiff’s damages to be causally related to the defendant’s fraud.  
Put differently, a 10b-5 plaintiff does not benefit from post-disclosure price depreciation that is 
unrelated to the fraud.  Why then should an unrelated, post-disclosure price recovery benefit the 
defendant?   
Market price is essentially a reflection of the present value of the future cash flows to 
which the shareholder is entitled.  When a corporation discloses that it made a material 
misrepresentation, the expected value of the future cash flows decreases, and thus the present 
value of the stock depreciates.  Subsequent appreciation in the value of the stock may be the 
result of an expected increase in future cash flows due to unrelated circumstances, or it may be 
the result of the market realizing that the fraud will not have as big of an impact on future cash 
flows as previously thought.  The portion of depreciation in the stock that correctly reflects the 
decrease in the expected cash flows caused by revelation of the fraud, as opposed to a market 
overreaction, represents actual economic loss.  Subsequent unrelated appreciations do not 
compensate the investor for these losses, because absent the fraud, the stock would have retained 
its value, and the shareholder would have benefited from the unrelated gain.  
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 Instead of the Malin rule, trial courts should require the plaintiff to prove that post-
disclosure depreciations were caused by revelations of the defendant’s fraud.  Given the 
complexity of financial markets, this may seem like an arduous task, but if the stock price drops 
on high volume immediately following disclosure there can be little doubt as to its genesis.   
Once the plaintiff has carried his burden of proving that losses were caused by the defendant’s 
fraud, the burden should shift to the defendant to prove that subsequent gains were related and 
should offset the plaintiff’s damages, dollar for dollar.  This analysis is much more difficult but 
should consider factors such as the amount of time that has elapsed since disclosure (i.e., the 
more time that has elapsed, the more likely it is that gains are unrelated),
210
 and whether there are 
other circumstances that have surfaced since disclosure that would tend to cause the stock to 
appreciate (other revelations and events indicate that the gain is unrelated).  
Holding that post-disclosure appreciation to above the plaintiff’s purchase price precludes 
economic loss as a matter of law works an injustice on the 10b-5 plaintiff and benefits the 
corporations that engage in fraudulent behavior.  As such, the Malin rule should be overruled 
throughout the United States and replaced with a standard that strives to determine what loss was 
caused by the fraud and what loss what caused by market overreaction.  Though this task may 
prove difficult, imprecision in the damages award is still better than denying victims of corporate 
fraud compensation for their real and irretrievable losses.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
210 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005). 
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